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CRIMINAL LAW-IN RE MOTION TO UNSEAL ELECTRONIC SUR­
VEILLANCE EVIDENCE. THIRD PARTY ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT­
ACQUIRED WIRETAP EVIDENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir­
cuit considered a challenge to the policy of non-disclosure to pri­
vate litigants of government-acquired electronic surveillance 
evidence. In In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evi
dence,l the court, in an en banc opinion, decided whether § 2517(3) 
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 ("Title 111"),2 as amended in 1970, provided for the disclosure 
of certain sealed electronic evidence. In particular, the court fo­
cused on whether evidence acquired and employed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in a criminal action against a de­
fendant can be used by private litigants in civil actions brought pur­
suant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
("RICO"P against the same defendant.4 
Howard J. Smith was involved in several real estate develop­
ment transactions with Donn H. Lipton. When the transactions 
failed, Smith brought a civil action against Lipton for violating 
RICO.s During discovery, Smith sought access to several of Lip­
ton's conversations that had been recorded and sealed by the FBI 
pursuant to Title III as part of an electronic surveillance of a third . 
party's office.6 
Smith filed a motion in federal district court to unseal the tapes 
and corresponding transcripts because he believed that they would 
support his allegation of RICO violations by Lipton.7 The district 
court interpreted § 2517 of Title III as prohibiting the disclosure of 
1. 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
2. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 254 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988». 
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). 
4. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1016. 
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such evidence.8 Accordingly, the court denied Smith's motion.9 In 
1992, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
§ 2517(3) governs the disclosure of intercepted communications, 
and that, under limited circumstances, intercepted communications 
not previously made public may be made available to private liti­
gants.1° In April 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
granted Lipton's petition for a rehearing en banc and vacated the 
panel opinion. 11 Thereafter, by a vote of seven to five, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion 
and held that § 2517(3) does not authorize disclosure of previously 
undisclosed wiretap evidence to private civil RICO litigants.12 
Moreover, the court held that even if § 2517(3) did authorize disclo­
sure to private civil RICO litigants, at no point did it authorize pre­
trial disclosure to such persons.13 
This Note will consider the en banc decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in In re Motion to Unseal Electronic 
Surveillance Evidence. Part I.A of the Note will provide the legisla­
tive history behind TItle III and Congress' intent in enacting and 
then amending § 2517(3). Part I.B will discuss the discovery rules 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their provision for 
broad discovery. Part I.C will examine prior case law that considers 
§ 2517(3) in the'context of civillitigatio~. Part II will discuss the 
factual setting and the procedural history of In re Electronic Evi­
dence and the majority and dissenting opinions issued by the appel­
late court. Part III will analyze the holdings of the courts of appeals 
to date, including the holding of In re Electronic Evidence, which 
state that third parties (the general public and private litigants) 
should have access to wiretap materials that have been previously 
disclosed in a trial or in another courtroom proceeding. Part III 
will also compare the holdings of the courts of appeals with the 
language and legislative history of § 2517(3) and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure's allowanc,e for broad discovery. This compari­
son will illustrate that § 2517(3) should be interpreted as authoriz­
ing the disclosure of previously undisclosed surveillance evidence to 
8. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 638 
(8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (citing Smith v. Lipton, 
No. 91-643C(1) (E.D. Mo. May 7,1991». 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 639. 
11. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
12. Id. at 1020. 
13. Id. 
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private litigants before the civil trial commences 'as well as during 
the civil tria1.14 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 	 Legislative History of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
Title III was drafted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968.15 The purpose of the Act was: (1) "to 
assist State and local governments in reducing the incidence of 
crime;" (2) "to increase the effectiveness, fairness, and coordination 
of law enforcement and criminal justice systems at all levels of gov­
ernment;" and (3) "for other purposes."16 The Act was divided into 
five titlesP Title III, "Wrretapping and Electronic Surveillance," 
was enacted to prohibit all wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
by persons other than authorized law enforcement, communica­
tions, and government officials.1s Title III had a dual purpose: (1) 
to "protect[·] the privacy of wire and oral communications;" and (2) 
to "delineat[e] on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions 
under which the interception of wire and oral communications may 
be authorized. "19 To achieve these two purposes, Congress drafted 
Title III to conform to the constitutional standards established by 
14. For a general discussion of In re Electronic Evidence, see Thomas W. Jerry, 
Note, The End of the Line? In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence: 
Limiting Private Civil RICO Litigants' Access to Government Wiretaps, 38 ST. Lours U. 
L.J. 769 (1994). Noting Congress' concern with privacy in enacting Title Ill, the author 
concludes that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit properly interpreted 
§ 2517(3) of Title III as prohibiting the disclosure of wiretap evidence acquired by the 
government to private civil RICO litigants. Id. 
15. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 254 
. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988)). 
16. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N.2112. Other purposes include setting standards for the admissibility into 
trial of certain evidence and "reliev[ing] [the] overburdened Federal courts from the 
growing practice of convicted persons using the habeas corpus procedures as a substi­
tute for direct appeal." Id. at 2113. 
17. Id. Title I concerned "Law Enforcement Assistance." Title II concerned the 
"Admissibility of Confessions, Reviewability of Admission in Evidence of Confessions 
in State Cases, Admissibility in Evidence of Eyewitness Testimony, and Procedures in 
Obtaining Writs of Habeas Corpus." Title III concerned "Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance." Title IV dealt with "State Firearms Control Assistance." Title V con­
cerned "General Provisions" of the Act. Id. 
18. Id. at 2113, 2153-54. 
19. Id. at 2153. See also Thomas C. Banks, Note, Use of Surveillance Evidence 
Under Title IlL' Bridging the Legislative Gap Between the Language and Purpose of the 
. Sealing Requirement, 36 V AND. L. REv. 325,327-28 (1983) for a similar statement of the 
congressional objectives in enacting Title III. 
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the United States Supreme Court in the 1967 decisions of Berger v. 
New York20 and Katz v. United States,21 which held that eavesdrop­
ping on private conversations by the state is a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.22 "Working 
from the hypothesis that any wiretapping and electronic surveil­
lance legislation should include the ... constitutional standards [set 
out by the Supreme Court], the [Senate] subcommittee ... used the 
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger, the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
petitioner's conviction for conspiring to bribe a public official. The conviction was 
achieved, in great part, by utilizing recordings of incriminating conversations. The re­
cordings were obtained by installing a recording device in an office, pursuant to an 
order issued by a state supreme court justice in accordance with a New York state stat­
ute. The Court held that the New York eavesdrop statute was unconstitutional because 
it resulted in a trespassory intrusion into the petitioner's Fourth Amendment right to 
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 44. 
The Berger Court outlined the constitutional standards by which the New York 
eavesdrop statute and other similar statutes would be measured. The Court's findings 
are summarized as follows: (1) the application for the court-ordered eavesdrop must 
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized; (2) 
the application must particularly describe what specific crime has been or is being com­
mitted; (3) the application must give a particular description of the type of conversation 
sought; (4) certain limitations on the police officer executing the court-ordered eaves­
drop are necessary, such as an inability to search unauthorized areas and an inability to 
use the court-order as'a "passkey to a further search" once the sought after conversa­
tion or information had been found; (5) police officers must obtain a new court-order 
supported by probable cause when resuming a search they have previously abandoned; 
(6) police officers cannot execute a court-order over a "prolonged and extended pe­
riod;" and (7) an executing police officer must make a return on the court-order show­
ing how it was executed and what was seized. Id. at 55-57. 
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional 
criteria it set out in Berger and stressed an additional factor: a neutral and detached 
magistrate should preside over the application for and court-ordering of the eavesdrop. 
Id. at 356. Applying this additional factor, the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's 
conviction for placing bets via telephone in violation of a federal anti-gambling statute, 
because the recordings of petitioner's incriminating telephone conversations admitted 
into trial as evidence were made with neither authorization nor supervision by a neutral 
magistrate. In this case, FBI agents had taken it upon themselves to attach a recording 
device to the public telephone booth from where the petitioner placed his betting calls 
in order to electronically survey-the resulting conversations. Because there was no neu­
tral magistrate to evaluate the presence or absence of probable cause in placing the 
recording device on the telephone booth or to evaluate the ensuing surveillance and 
recording, the Court held the activity to be a violation of the petitioner's Fourth 
Amendment right of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 356-57, 
359. 
22. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV states: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­

fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­

tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or 

things to be seized. 

Id. 
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Berger and Katz decisions as a guide in drafting [T]itle III. "23 
1. Section 2517(3) of TItle III as Enacted in 196824 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 2517, as enacted in 1968,25 author­
ized investigative or law enforcement officers, who had obtained 
knowledge of the contents26 of any intercepted communication or 
evidence derived from that communication, to disclose such infor­
23. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2163. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: 
Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CIuM. L. & CIuMINOWGY I, 7-32 
(1983) (discussing the Supreme Court decisions that ultimately induced Congress to 
adopt TItle III). 
24. As originally enacted in 1968, § 2517, Authorization for Disclosure and Use of 
Intercepted Wire and Oral Communications, read as follows: 
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means 
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire 
or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such 
contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that 
such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties 
of the officer making or receiving the disclosure. 
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means 
authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire 
or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents 
to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official 
duties. 
(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, 
any information concerning a wire or oral communication, or evidence derived 
therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter may 
disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence while 
giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any 
court of the United States or of any State or in any Federal or State grand jury 
proceeding. 
(4) No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted in 
accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its 
privileged character. 
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in 
intercepting wire or oral communications in the manner authorized herein, 
intercepts wire or oral communications relating to offenses other than those 
specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and 
evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in 
subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Such contents and any evidence 
derived therefrom may be used under subsection (3) of this section when 
authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge 
finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be 
made as soon as practicable. 
18 U.S.c. § 2517 (Supp. IV 1969). 
25. See supra note 24 for the text of § 2517(1), (2) as originally enacted in 1968. 
26. The statute defined "contents" as including "any information concerning the 
identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (Supp. IV 1969). 
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mation to other officers or to use such information in the perform­
ance of their legal duties.27 Paragraph (3) of the section provided 
that: 
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by th[e] 
chapter, any information concerning a wire or oral communica­
tion, or evidence derived therefrom ... may disclose the contents 
of that communication or such derivative evidence while giving 
testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in 
any court of the United States or of any State or in any Federal 
or State grand jury proceeding.28 
In enacting § 2517(3), Congress envisioned that such intercepted 
evidence would be disclosed and used at a criminal trial to "estab­
lish [a defendant's] guilt directly."29 Congress also envisioned that 
intercepted evidence could be utilized to establish guilt indirectly 
by corroborating or impeaching a witness' testimony or by refresh­
ing a witness' memory.30 Congress' use of the word "guilt" rather 
than "liability" in the Senate Report accompanying the proposed 
bill,31 coupled with the authorization for disclosure "in any criminal 
proceeding,"32 makes it clear, however, that Congress did not con­
template disclosure of intercepted communications or derivative 
evidence in anything but a criminal action. Disclosure or use in a 
civil action was not even considered a possibility until 1970, when 
§ 2517(3) was amended. 
2. The 1970 Amendment to Section 2517(3)33 
Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 197034 
27. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1969). 
28. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (Supp. IV 1969) (emphasis added). 
29. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2188. 
30. Id. at 2188-89. 
31. Id. at 2188. 
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the text of § 2517(3) as origi­
nally enacted in 1968. 
33. Section 2517(3), as amended in 1970, states: 
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any 
infonnation concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence 
derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative 
evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding 
held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political 
subdivision thereof. 
18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1988) (emphasis added). 
34. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073. 
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to "seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by 
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by 
establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced 
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of 
those engaged in organized crime."35 Title IX of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970,36 entitled the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"),37 authorized both criminal 
and civil penalties for engaging in racketeering activities.38 In addi­
tion, RICO amended § 2517(3) of Title IIp9 to provide for testimo­
nial disclosure of the contents of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications or evidence derived from such contents in "any 
proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any 
State or political subdivision thereof."40 
In the House of Representatives Report accompanying the 
proposed bill for the Organized Crime Control Act, the House in­
terpreted § 2517(3), as amended by RICO, as "authoriz[ing] civil 
treble damage suits on the part of private parties who are injured"41 
and providing for "civil investigative demands."42 Specifically, the 
House Report interpreted the amended § 2517(3) as "permit[ting] 
evidence obtained through the interception of wire or oral commu­
nications under court order to be employed in civil actions. "43 
B. 	 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's Provisions for Broad 
Discovery 
Title III, as originally enacted and as amended, was an attempt 
by Congress to balance competing interests. The discovery rules of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are a congressional attempt to 
35. 	 Id. 
36. 	 18 U.S.c. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). 
37. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was enacted as TI­
tle IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 
Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988». 
38. H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N.4007. Congress defined "racketeering activity" to include "murder, kid­
naping [sic], gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, narcotics violations, counter­
feiting, usury, mail/bankruptcy/wire/securities fraud, and obstruction of justice." Id. at 
4032. 
39. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 254 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988». 
40. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988). See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the 
language of § 2517(3) prior to the 1970 amendment. 
41. 	 H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4010. 
42. 	 Id. 
43. 	 Id. at 4036. 
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strike a similar balance. Title III attempted to balance the privacy 
interests of individuals engaged in wire, oral, and electronic com­
munications with the needs of government and law enforcement 
personnel to obtain access to those communications. The discovery 
rules attempt to balance the privacy interests of individuals possess­
ing certain information with the needs of civil litigants in obtaining 
access to that information. 
The stated purpose of discovery is to "aid [civil litigants] in the 
preparation or presentation of [their] case[s]"44 by granting them 
access to pertinent facts, names of witnesses, specific documents, or 
"any other matters which may aid"45 them. Congress authorized 
civil litigants to obtain such information by several methods,46 in­
cluding written and oral depositions,47 written interrogatories,48 and 
production of documents or objects for inspection.49 Depositions 
are out-of-court proceedings conducted under oath before a judicial 
officer in answer to questions or interrogatories.50 Interrogatories 
are questions about the litigation at issue submitted before trial by 
one party to the other party, witness, or other person having infor­
mation of interest in the case, the answers to which are usually 
given under oath.51 
In order to aid civil litigants in the preparation of their actions, 
Congress enacted broad discovery rules containing general lan­
guage. Rule 26(b)(1), delineating the scope and limits of discovery, 
states that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action. "52 Congress also instructed the courts to interpret 
the discovery rules broadly. For example, the Advisory Commit­
tee's explanatory statement regarding the 1970 amendments to the 
discovery rules stated that the amendments were "designed to en­
courage extrajudicial discovery with a minimum of court 
in terven tion. "53 
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note. 
45. Id. The United States Supreme Court has stated that access to and knowl­
edge of such information is necessary for a civil action to be properly adjudicated. 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 27-32 govern the taking and use of depositions. 
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 governs the taking and use of interrogatories. 
49. FED. R. Cw. P. 34 and 45 govern the production of documents and things in 
response to requests and subpoenas, respectively. 
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 440 (6th ed. 1990). See also FED. R. CIv. P.27-32. 
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (6th ed. 1990). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 33. 
52. FED. R. Cw. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
53. FED. R. CIv. P. 2,6-37 advisory committee's explanatory statement. On April 
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Despite the discovery rules' stated purpose of promoting ac­
cess to as much relevant information as possible, the rules contain 
provisions that check civil litigants' power to gain access to informa­
tion when such access would overburden or infringe upon the pri­
vacy interests of another party. Specifically, Rule 26(c) provides 
that a protective order may be issued by a court, upon motion by a 
party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, when neces­
sary to protect the party or person from "annoyance, embarrass­
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."54 Protective 
orders afford such protection by permitting courts to allow a discov­
ery request to be ignored.55 They also authorize courts to require 
that certain information not be requested, or if already requested, 
not produced.56 Furthermore, protective orders permit courts to 
require parties to conduct discovery with no witnesses present other 
than court-designated ones.57 Such limitations on the discovery 
process ensure that civil litigants gather as much information as 
possible while protecting the privacy interests of the persons from 
whom the information is sought.58 . 
22,1993, the Supreme Court submitted proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, including several changes to the discovery rules. Congress took no 
action against the amendments. As a result, the amendments went into effect on De­
cember I, 1993. The changes to the discovery rules were designed to minimize court 
intervention in the discovery process while maximizing the opportunities of opposing 
litigants to work together to develop a discovery schedule for the action. See Hon. 
Ronald J. Hedges, What You Should Know About the Proposed Civil Procedure Rules 
Amendments, 39 PRAC. LAW. December 1993, at 33 for a brief synopsis of the major 
alterations to the discovery rules by the 1993 amendments. 




58. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c), Protective Orders, reads as follows: 
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, 
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dis­
pute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the 
action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court 
in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the follow­
ing[;] (1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had: [sic] (2) that the disclo­
sure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including 
a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a 
method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; 
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure 
or discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted 
with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposi­
tion, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade 
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As additional protection of the privacy interests of persons 
possessing discoverable information, the rules contain built-in stan­
dards by which discovery will be allowed or denied. The Advisory 
Committee's explanatory statement concerning the 1970 amend­
ments to the discovery rules states that "a showing of need is re­
quired for discovery of 'trial preparation' materials."59 Rule 
26(b )(3) states that "a party may obtain discovery of documents 
and tangible things otherwise discoverable ... only upon a showing 
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materi­
als ... and that the party is unable without undue hardship to ob­
tain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."60 
Rule 34 requires a special showing before the production of docu­
ments and tangible things will be allowed.61 With respect to the 
production of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
trial, a showing of "substantial need of the materials in the prepara­
tion of the case and [an] inability without undue hardship to obtain 
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means is neces­
sary."62 With respect to the production of documents not prepared 
in anticipation of litigation or trial, "a showing that the documents 
are relevant to the subject matter of the action is necessary."63 
The discovery rules also contain standards for denying a civil 
litigant's discovery request. Rule 26(b )(2) states that "[t]he fre­
quency or extent of use of the discovery methods ... shall be lim­
ited by the court if it determines that ... the burden . . . of the 
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information 
not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and (8) that the par­
ties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed 
envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or other 
person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to 
the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
Id. 
59. FED. R. CIY. P. 26-37 advisory committee's explanatory statement. 
60. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
61. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note states that "Rule 34 in 
terms requires a showing of 'good cause' for the production of all documents and 
things, whether or not trial preparation is involved." Id. The phrase "good cause" was 
eliminated from the language of Rule 34 because it "tended to encourage confusion and 
controversy." Id. However, the requirement of a "special showing" was retained. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (citing Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 1960); Hou­
dry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 24 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1955». 
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proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit."64 To make this de­
termination, the court must "tak[ e] into account the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the impor­
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of 
the proposed discovery in resolving the issue. "65 
Subsequent to the enactments in 1970 of the amendments to 
the discovery rules and to § 2517(3) of Title III, federal district and 
appellate courts debated whether § 2517(3), as amended,allowed 
private civil litigants to obtain disclosure during discovery of sur­
veillance material gathered by the government pursuant to Title III. 
These courts focused on disclosure of surveillance material that had 
not been exposed to the public in an earlier criminal trial and would 
not be revealed through testimony in the civil trial. 




Courts that have addressed whether § 2517(3) of Title III au­
thorizes disclosure of wiretap evidence to the public at large or to 
private civil litigants 'have concluded that § 2517(3) allows such dis­
closure only after the materials have been admitted into evidence at 
an earlier criminal tria1.67 No court has read § 2517(3) to authorize 
disclosure of wiretap material to the general public or to private 
litigants prior to the materials' use in a criminal trial or during the 
discovery phase of a private litigant's civil action.68 
1. 	 United States v. Dorfman69 
In United States v. Dorfman, various newspaper publishers and 
broadcasters moved the court to unseal evidence exhibits submitted 
by the government so that the exhibits could be inspected and cop­
ied,1° All of the exhibits contained wiretap materials. The criminal 
64. 	 FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b)(2). 
65. 	 Id. 
66. 	 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
67. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54­
55 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1982); County 
of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied 
sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985). 
68. In County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 370, the court stated that disclosing 
previously undisclosed surveillance materials to private litigants pursuing civil RICO 
claims "presents a different problem" than the one before the court. Id. The court 
declined to address the issue because the case could be resolved on other grounds. Id. 
69. 	 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982). 
70. 	 Id. at 1231. 
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defendants argued that the court could not release any of the sealed 
exhibits because they had not yet been put into evidence at the 
criminal trial. The defendants urged that the release of the exhibits 
would violate Title 111.71 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir­
cuit held that Title III does not create a right of public access to 
sealed wiretap evidence.72 According to the court in dicta, the only 
way that the public would have a right of access to the sealed wire­
tap evidence acquired by the government would be after the sealed 
evidence had been admitted into evidence in a criminal trial or in 
"some other public proceeding within the scope of section 
2517(3)."73 The court failed, however, to specify what other types 
of public proceedings are within the scope of § 2517(3). The Dorf­
man court was most likely referring to a civil trial or other public 
proceeding conducted pursuant to a civil action. Such a proceeding 
is, in fact, what Congress intended when it amended § 2517(3).74 
2. 	 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Department of 
Justice75 
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Department of 
Justice, the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC") sought per­
mission from the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut to inspect and copy wiretap recordings made by the 
government pursuant to Title 111.'6 NBC wanted to use the wiretap 
recordings in its defense of a libel action filed against it by popular 
singer Wayne Newton.77 NBC believed that the wiretap recordings 
would prove that NBC's television broadcasts concerning Wayne 
Newton and his connection to organized crime members were accu­
rate and true.78 The government opposed the disclosure of the 
71. 	 Id. 
72. 	 Id. at 1233. 
73. Id. The court stated that Title III "put no limits on the public disclosure of 
lawfully obtained wiretap evidence through public testimony in legal proceedings; but 
neither did it authorize wiretap evidence not made public in this manner to be made 
public another way." Id. at 1234. 
74. The House Report accompanying the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3) stated 
that Congress was altering the language of the statute in order to permit wire or oral 
communications evidence to be employed in civil actions. H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st 
Cong.,2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,4036. See supra notes 
33-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the language and legislative history of 
§ 2517(3) as amended. 
75. 	 735 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984). 
76. 	 Id. 
77. 	 Id. 
78. 	 Id. at 52. 
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recordings.79 
NBC argued that the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3) allows the 
government to disclose a communication obtained by a legal wire­
tap "in any proceeding held under the authority of the United 
States."80 NBC argued that its defense of the libel action was 
within the definition of "any proceeding" and that, therefore, the 
district court judge had erred in denying its application for disclo­
sure by the government. 81 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit agreed with the district court, however, that there should be 
no disclosure to NBC. The NBC court ·stated that it was certam 
that Congress did not intend § 2517(3) "to make the fruits of wire­
tapping broadly available to all civil litigants who show a need for 
them,"82 and that "turning Title III into a general civil discovery 
mechanism would simply ignore the privacy rights of those whose 
conversations are overheard."83 
3. County of Oakland v. City of Detroit84 
Eight months after the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
handed down its decision in NBC, a federal district court in Michi­
gan also concluded that § 2517(3) did not authorize the disclosure 
of surveillance material gathered by the government to private civil 
litigants. In County of Oakland v. City of Detroit,85 the County of 
Oakland brought an action against the Mayor of Detroit and the 
City of Detroit for violating the Sherman Act86 and RIC087 
through bribery, corruption, and breach of fiduciary duty.88 The 
County of Oakland had entered into several contracts with the City 
of Detroit in ·which the city was to transport, treat, and dispose of 
the county's waste to the city's facilities. The contract price was 
based on the city's actual cost in providing the specified services.89 
In its action, the county contended that the city inflated its costs in 
providing the services, which inflated the amount that the city 
79. Id. 
80. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988). 
81. NBC, 735 F.2d at 54. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. 610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied sub nom Oakland County 
by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985) .. 
85. Id. 
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15 (1988). 
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a), (c) (1988). 
88. County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 365. 
89. Id. 
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charged the county, thereby violating the Sherman Act and 
RICO.90 
As part of its action, the county subpoenaed the Assistant 
United States Attorney for release of wiretaps the United States 
Attorney's Office had obtained pursuant to Title III as part of a 
criminal investigation of the Detroit Water and Sewage Depart­
ment ("DWSD").91 Some of the wiretaps sought by the county had 
been previously disclosed at the criminal trials of DWSD officials.92 
The court held that it would honor the subpoenas seeking surveil­
lance material disclosed during the criminal trials, because once ma­
terial has been disclosed, it becomes a question of the public's right 
to access to evidence admitted in open court versus a defendant's 
privacy interests.93 The court stated that, in this situation, the pub­
lic's right to access prevailed.94 
The county also sought surveillance material that had not pre­
viously been disclosed by the government in any of the earlier crim­
inal trials of DWSD officials.95 The court found no authority for 
such disclosure of materials in the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3). 
Although "the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3) clearly indicates that 
Congress intended that surveillance material gathered pursuant to 
Title III could be used in some civil proceedings,"96 the court rea­
soned that "it is not clear that Congress intended private litigants 
pursuing civil RICO claims could gain access to such surveillance 
materials."97 In addition to § 2517(3)'s lack of clarity as to whom 
previously undisclosed surveillance materials could be disclosed, 
the court observed that § 2517(3) is also unclear as to the manner in 
which the materials can be disclosed. The court noted that the 1970 
amendment to § 2517(3) did not change the section's language re-. 
garding the method of disclosure. The court reasoned that Con­
gress therefore intended the same method of disclosure that had 
been permitted in the 1968 version of § 2517(3) to apply.98 The 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 366. 
93. Id. at 369. 
94. Id. The court held that the public's right to access prevails because once sur­
veillance material has been disclosed, "the purpose of Section 2517(3) ceases and the 
requirements of that section no longer govern" so that "the privacy interests of the 
defendants cannot stand as an obstacle to the public's access to evidence admitted in 
open court." Id. 
95. Id. at 370. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. The court also pointed to a federal district court case concluding that 
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1968 version allowed disclosure "while giving testimony under oath 
or affirmation in any criminal proceeding in any" federal or state 
court or grand jury.99 The court concluded that "it appears that 
disclosure of the wiretap material not presented during the criminal 
trials [for use in the county's civil action against the city] cannot be 
required pursuant to pre-trial or discovery subpoenas absent some 
further showing," without elaborating as to what such "further 
showing" would be.lOo 
4. United States v. Rosentha[101 
In United States v. Rosenthal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit relied on dicta in United States v. Dorfman102 to 
hold that Title III creates no' independent bar to the public's right 
of access to wiretap materials legally intercepted and previously ad­
mitted into evidence at a criminal trial pursuant to TItle III. In Ro­
senthal, a television station filed a motion to review all 
documentary and physical evidence, which included wiretap materi­
als obtained by the government that had been or was going to be 
admitted as evidence in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that, once the materials have been ad­
mitted into evidence in a court proceeding, "there is no indication 
either in Title III or its legislative history to support [a] court's con­
clusion that TItle III material may not be further disclosed."1()3 The 
court stated that once "the audiotapes were played in open 'court 
[in a criminal trial] and admitted into evidence, [it could] perceive 
of no legitimate reason to create an absolute bar of further dissemi­
nation of these materials"l04 to a public entity - in this case a tele­
vision station. 
In none of the aforementioned cases did a court interpret 
§ 2517(3) to authorize disclosure of government-acquired wiretap 
disclosure pursuant to § 2517(3) could only be made through the trial testimony of a 
government agent. Id. (citing Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427 (D.D.C. 1984». 
99. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (Supp. IV 1969) (emphasis added). 
lOll County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 371. The court's language left the door 
open for the second prong of the In re Electronic Evidence panel opinion's balancing 
test, which required that disclosure to private litigants be denied absent a showing by 
the private litigant of a compelling need that cannot be met any other way. In re Mo­
tion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 1992), va­
cated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See infra note 129 and accompanying 
text for the panel opinion's five-part balancing test. 
101. 763 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1985). 
102. 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982). 
103. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d at 1293. 
104. Id. 
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materials to the public or to a private litigant before the materials 
were disclosed in a criminal trial. Recently, the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit directly addressed and then readdressed the 
issue of pre-trial disclosure in In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Sur­
veillance Evidence .105 




A. Facts and Procedural History 
Donn H. Lipton was involved in real estate development trans­
actions with several business associates in St. Louis, Missouri. 1\vo 
of Lipton's business associates, Sorkis Webbe, Sr. and Sorkis 
Webbe, Jr., were under criminal investigation by the Federal Bu­
reau of Investigation ("FBI").107 Pursuant to the investigation, the 
FBI conducted an electronic surveillance of the Webbes' offices, in­
tercepting and taping many conversations that took place in those 
locations. lOB Among the intercepted and taped conversations were 
conversations that the Webbes had with Donn Lipton.109 
The government prosecuted the Webbes in 1985 in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.llo During 
the course of Sorkis Webbe, Jr.'s criminal trial, the FBI introduced 
some of the taped conversations between Lipton and Webbe, Jr. as 
evidence.1ll The remainder of the taped conversations were'"not 
admitted into Webbe Jr.'s criminal trial. Instead, the tapes were 
placed under seal by the trial COurt.112 
Howard J. Smith was also involved in real estate transactions 
with Donn Lipton. In 1990, when several of the transactions 
proved unsuccessful, Smith filed a civil suit against Lipton in the 
Circuit Court of St. Louis City on theories of fraud, tortious inter­
105. 965 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
106. 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
107. Id. at 1016. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. (citing United States v. Webbe, 652 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Mo. 1985». Ulti­
mately, only Sorkis Webbe, Jr. was brought to trial. Prior to trial, Sorkis Webbe, Sr. 
died. Webbe, 652 F. Supp. at 22. 
111. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1016 (citing United States v. Webbe, 
791 F.2d 103, 104 (8th Cir. 1986». See also Webbe, 652 F. Supp. at 22 (denying Sorkis 
Webbe, Jr.'s motion to suppress the taped conversations and other electronic surveil­
lance evidence). 
112. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1016. 
387 1995] GOVERNMENT ACQUIRED WIRETAP EVIDENCE 
ference, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of RICO.113 Dur­
ing the discovery phase of the civil suit, Smith filed a motion in 
federal district court for the Eastern District of Missouri to unseal 
the tapes of conversations between Lipton and the Webbes.114 
Smith believed that the taped conversations contained information 
that would support his allegation of RICO violations by Lipton.115 
The district court held that its authority, if any, to provide 
Smith with access to the taped conversations could come only from 
§ 2517(3) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.116 However, the district court interpreted 
§ 2517(3) as prohibiting such access.117 Smith then appealed the 
district court's interpretation to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. I IS 
B. Panel Opinion119 
1. Majority Opinion of Judge Beam 
For guidance in determining whether § 2517(3), as amended in 
1970,120 authorizes disclosure of intercepted communications not 
previously made public in a prior criminal or civil trial to private 
civil litigants, the panel opinion looked first to the purpose and in­
tent of Congress in enacting TItle III. The court stated that the pur­
pose of TItle III was to "balance the needs of criminal-law 
enforcement with the privacy interest of individuals engaged in 
wire, oral, or electronic communications."121 The court noted that 
Congress balanced these two competing interests by allowing the 
government to intercept such communications but with certain limi­
tations.122 However, the court was not as certain about Congress' 
intent in amending § 2517(3) of TItle III within RICO. According 
113. Id. 
114. Id. (citing Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip. op. at 1 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 
1991». 
115. Id. 
116. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 638. 
117. Id. 
118. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637 (8th 
Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
119. Id. 
120. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended. 
121. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 640 (citing Title III - Wiretapping & 
Electronic Surveillance: Findings, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801,82 Stat. 211, 211 (1968), 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 237). For a list of the purposes of Title III, see supra 
notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
122. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 640. The limitations include authoriz­
ing interception only for specifically enumerated offenses. Id. (citing 18 U.S.c. 
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to the court, it was "not at all clear" that, when Congress "included 
the amendment to section 2517(3) within ... RICO," it intended to 
grant private civil litigants· access to previously undisclosed inter­
cepted communications.123 It was "not at all clear" to the court be­
cause no commentary in the congressional report on RICO 
addressed that particular question.124 The court refused to "specu­
late" about Congress' intent. Rather, it looked elsewhere in order 
to resolve the issue.125 
The court compared communications intercepted pursuant to 
Title III to "any other evidence seized"126 and concluded that both 
types of evidence should be subject to the policy and evidentiary 
concerns of the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
·dure.127 Since the discovery rules carefully balance the confidenti­
ality and privacy interests of litigants with the "compelling need for 
discovery,"l28 the court in In re Electronic Evidence fashioned a 
five-part test that also balanced these competing interests in order 
to determine when intercepted communications evidence may be 
disclosed to private civil litigants. The five-part test developed by 
the court was as follows: 
[A]ny government objection to disclosure should be afforded 
great weight. Additionally, disclosure is never proper unless the 
party seeking disclosure has shown a compelling need that can­
not be accommodated by any other means. Thus, the court 
should conduct an in camera inspection of the intercepted com­
munications to evaluate whether a compelling need exists. Fur­
thermore, if the confidentiality or privacy interests of a nonparty 
appear to be substantially compromised by disclosure, the party 
seeking disclosure has an affirmative duty to notify the non­
party.... Finally, ... [t]he party requesting access must particu­
larize his or her request and the district court should issue 
protective orders as it deems appropriate.129 
The court held that wiretap evidence not previously made public 
§ 2516(1) (1988». Limitations also include interception only with prior court approval. 
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(2), 2518 (1988». 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citing S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969) and H.R. REp. No. 
1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4034). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 641. 
127. Id. The discovery rules are contained in Rules 26-37 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
128. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 641. 
129. Id. at 642 (citation omitted). 
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may be disclosed to private civil litigants pursuant to § 2517(3) if 
this five-part test is met,130 Thereafter, the court reversed the deci­
sion of the district court prohibiting disclosure of the sealed wiretap 
evidence to Smith as a civil litigant and remanded the case "for 
findings consistent with [its] opinion."131 
2. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Heaney132 
Judge Heaney, in his dissent, agreed with the district court that 
§ 2517 did not authorize the disclosure of electronically intercepted 
conversations to private litigants where that information has not 
been disclosed previously in a trial.133 Judge Heaney stated that the 
majority's five-part test134 was contrary to the plain meaning of 
§ 2517(3) and Congress' intent in enacting and amending 
§ 2517(3).135 He also stated that "parts of the test [were] vague, 
providing little guidance to district courts that must apply it."136 To 
support his position of nondisclosure, Judge Heaney looked first to 
the plain meaning of § 2517 and stated that he could see "no words 
in section 2517 that permit law enforcement officers to disclose to 
private litigants information obtained for law enforcement purposes 
unless that information has first been disclosed in a public trial."137 
Judge Heaney then cited to "Congress's [sic] clear intent to protect 
the privacy of oral and written communications to the greatest ex­
tent possible"· as further support for his position of 
nondisclosure.138 
Lipton petitioned for a rehearing en banco The Court of Ap­
peals for the Eighth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the 
panel opinion.139 Thereafter, by a vote of seven to five, the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order of the district 
130. Id. at 641. 
131. Id. at 642. 
132. Id. at 642-43 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Judge Heaney wrote for the majority 
in the en banc opinion of In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 
F.2d 1015, 1016-20 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See infra part II.C for a discussion of 
Judge Heaney's majority opinion. 
133. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 642 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for the majority opinion's five-
part test. . 
135. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 642-43 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citing 
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972». 
136. Id. at 643. 
137. Id. at 642. 
138. Id. 
139. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (en banc). 
390 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW. [Vol. 17:371 
court.140 
C. En Bane Opinion of Judge Heaney141 
Judge Heaney, this time writing for the majority,142 held that 
there was no authority in § 2517(3) of Title III for sealed electronic 
surveillance evidence, not previously made public, to be disclosed 
to a private civil RICO litigant.143 Judge Heaney stated that, when 
addressing disclosure of the contents of a wiretap, the question the 
court must ask is "whether TItle III specifically authorizes such dis­
closure, not whether TItle III specifically prohibits the disclosure," 
because TItle III prohibits all disclosures that are not specifically 
authorized.l44 Noting the drafters' concern for conversational pri­
vacy when originally enacting § 2517(3) and the legislative history 
of the 1970 amendment to § 2517(3), the judge failed to find any 
evidence that the subsection authorizes such disclosure.145 · Judge 
Heaney stated that a civil litigant's need is an irrelevant considera­
tion, absent language in § 2517(3) to that effect.l46 Finally, he 
stated that, if § 2517(3) does authorize disclosure to a private civil 
litigant such as Smith, "[a]t no point does section 2517(3) authorize 
pretrial disclosure."147 
1. Drafters' Concern for Conversational Privacy 
Judge Heaney noted that TItle III was enacted in response to 
two 1967 Supreme Court decisions that held eavesdropping by the' 
government on private conversations to be a violation of the peti­
. tioners' Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.148· Judge Heaney noted that one of the two 
stated purposes of Title III was to "protect[] the privacy of wire 
140. Id. at 1020. 
141. Id. at 1015. 
142. Judge Heaney wrote the dissenting opinion of the panel decision of In re 
Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 642-43 (8th Cir. 
1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See supra notes 132-39 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Heaney's dissenting opinion. 
143. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1020. 
144. Id. at 1018 (citing United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 110 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th 
Cir. 1982)). 
145. Id. at 1018-20. 
146. Id. at 1020. 
147. Id. (emphasis added). 
148. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1017 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)). See supra notes 20-21 for a 
discussion of Katz and Berger. 
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and oral communications."149 Judge Heaney also noted that the 
congressional drafters' concern for conversational privacy was evi­
denced by Congress' provision for very limited disclosure. He 
pointed specifically to § 2518(8)(a), which requires that recordings 
made under TItle III be sealed by the authorizing judge, and § 2517, 
which allows disclosure under only very specific circumstances.150 
2. 	 Legislative History of the 1970 Ainendment to Section 
2517(3) 
Judge Heaney next considered what effect the 1970 amend­
ment to § 2517(3) had on the ability of the court to interpret the 
subsection as authorizing disclosure of electronic surveillance evi­
dence. Prior to the 1970 amendment, § 2517(3) provided for court­
room testimonial disclosure in criminal proceedings only.151 With 
the passage of RICO in1970, however, the subsection was amended 
by Congress to allow for testimonial disclosure of electronic surveil­
lance evidence in civil proceedings as well as criminal proceed­
ingS.152 Despite this alteration to the language of § 2517(3), Judge 
Heaney found that the legislative history of the 1970 amendment 
did not support Smith's arguinent that, as amended, § 2517(3) au­
thorizes disclosure of such evidence not previously made public to 
private civil RICO litigants, both before the civil trial has com­
menced and during the trial.153 In fact, Judge Heaney stated that 
the-legislative history provides "no assistance" to the court's analy­
sis.154 Quoting the district court opinion, the judge noted that the 
House of Representatives Report regarding the 1970 amendment 
made little comment on the amendment except to state what had 
linguistically changed in the subsection.155 Judge Heaney adopted 
the reasoning of the district court, which held that, if the 1970 
amendment "had been intended to open the door to private civil 
149. Id. at 1018 (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), re­
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2153). The other purpose was to "delineat[e] on a 
uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire 
and oral communications may be authorized." S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 
66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
150. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1018. 
151. Id. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the text of § 2517(3) as 
originally enacted. 
152. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended. 
153. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1018. 
154. Id. at 1018 n.4 (emphasis added). 
155. Id. at 1019 (quoting Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. 
Mo. May 7,1991». 
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RICO litigants, further comment would have been warranted."156 
Therefore, the brief explanation in the House Report suggests that 
Congress intended only that the "gatherer" of electronic surveil­
lance evidence - the government - would use it in a civil case.157 
3. Secondary Factors Affecting Disclosure 
Smith argued that the failure of the Department of Justice to 
oppose disclosure of the taped conversations upon his motion in 
federal district court should have been persuasive to the court in its. 
determination of the issue.158 To support his argument, Smith con­
trasted the position of the Department of Justice in NBC to oppose 
disclosure of wiretap evidence to NBC, a private civil litigant.159 
The government's opposition to disclosure to NBC was a significant 
factor in the NBC court's determination that § 2517(3) did not au­
thorize such disclosure.16o Smith cited County of Oakland v. City of 
Detroit161 for the proposition that "the Government is apparently 
given authority under § 2517(3) to determine whether release of the 
material would be in the overall public interest."162 Judge Heaney 
disagreed with Smith's contention that the government's deliberate 
decision in this case not to oppose disclosure to Smith was relevant. 
Judge Heaney held that § 2517(3) does not grant the government 
authority to determine when private litigants may make use of pre­
viously undisclosed wiretap information.163 Judge Heaney based 
this conclusion on a "careful reading of ... the statute itself,"I64 
156. Id. (quoting Smith, No. 91-643C(1) at 5-6). Judge Heaney stated that he and 
the other members of Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "WOUld need greater 
evidence of Congress's [sic] intent to read the 1970 amendment as setting [congres­
sional] concerns [for conversational privacy] aside when dealing with private civil RICO 
litigants." Id. 
157. Id. (quoting Smith, No. 91-643C(1) at 5-6). 
158. Id. 
159. Id. (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 
F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984». 
160. NBC, 735 F.2d at 54. 
161. 610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied sub nom. Oakland County 
by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 10tO (6th Cir. 1985). 
162. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1019 (quoting County of Oakland, 610 
F. Supp. at 370 (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 
F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984))). See supra part I.C.3 for a discussion of County of Oakland. 
163. Id. at 1019-20. The court refused to decide whether Title III allows "purely 
voluntary testimonial disclosure by the government during the course of private civil 
RICO litigation." Id. at 1020 n.5. However, the court stated that voluntary disclosure 
by the government "would appear to require court approval under §§ 2517(3) and (5)." 
Id. 
164. Id. at 1019. 
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noting that, simply because the government is able to decide 
whether it will utilize wiretap information in a trial in which it is a 
party, it does not automatically follow that the government has the 
power to decide whether private litigants are able to utilize that 
same information in civil trialS.165 
Finally, Smith argued that a private litigant's need for disclo­
sure of electronic surveillance evidence should be another factor in 
the court's determination as to whether § 2517(3) authorizes disclo­
sure of electronic surveillance evidence not previously made public 
to private civil RICO litigants. Judge Heaney disagreed, character­
izing a private litigant's need for such evidence as "irrelevant."I66 
For this proposition, Judge Heaney referred to the decision in NBC, 
in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit looked to 
Congress' intent in enacting the Organized Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act.167 The Second Circuit stated that, as contemplated by 
the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 168 the purpose of the 
Act was to make the fruits of wiretapping available to the govern­
ment for the enforcement of criminallaw.169 Despite the alteration 
of the language in § 2517(3), removing the specific reference to 
criminal proceedings, the court was "sure" that Congress did not 
pass the Act to "make the fruits of wiretapping broadly available to 
all civil litigants who show a need for them."17o 
4. 	 Section 2517(3) Does Not Authorize Disclosure to 
Private Civil Litigants Other Than During 
Testimony at Trial 
Judge Heaney concluded that Title III did not authorize disclo­
sure of electronic surveillance evidence previously undisclosed in an 
earlier criminal trial to private civil litigants such as Howard Smith. 
Further, even if it did, Title III would only authorize disclosure 
through the testimony of a witness· during a subsequent civil trial, 
because "[a]t no point does section 2517 authorize pretrial disclo­
sure."l71 The courts that had previously addressed the issue had 
reached an identical conclusion when they held that civil litigants 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 1020. 
167. Id. (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 
F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984». 
168. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra note 21 for a discussion of Katz. 
169. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1020 (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 54). 
170. Id. (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 54). 
171. Id. at 1020 (emphasis added). By "pre-trial disclosure," the court meant dis­
closure before the commencement of the private litigant's civil trial. See id. at 1020 n.5. 
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could obtain electronic surveillance material only through testi­
mony during their civil trials.172 In County of Oakland173 and 
Dowd v. Calabrese,174 the courts reasoned that their holdings com­
ported with the plain language of § 2517(3),175 which provides for 
disclosure of electronic communications or evidence derived from 
such communications "while giving testimony under oath or affir­
mation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United 
States or of any State."176 In citing to these earlier decisions, Judge 
Heaney agreed that the language of § 2517(3) unambiguously fails 
to provide for an alternative method of disclosure, such as prior to 
the commencement of a private civil litigant's trial.177 
D. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Beam178 
In his dissent, Judge Beam began by criticizing the majority's 
approach of "look[ing] not to the statutory language, [but] look[ing] 
instead to the rest of the title into which the words are placed and 
. . . look[ing] to 'the legislative struggle leading to its enact­
ment."'179 Judge Beam criticized the court for using public policy in 
its analysis of the issue rather than analyzing the issue based upon 
either the "language of the law" or "commonly accepted principles 
172. Id. at 1020 (citing Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 435 (D.D.C. 1984); 
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 371 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal 
denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985». 
173. County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), 
appeal denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 
1985). See supra part I.C.3 for a discussion of this case. 
174. 101 F.R.D. 427 (D.D.C. 1984). In Dowd, two former Department of Justice 
attorneys brought a libel action against the Wall Street Journal and the author of an 
allegedly libelous article. Id. at 430. The article alleged that the government attorneys 
had acted improperly by pressuring an organized crime member to become a govern­
ment witness in the prosecution of another member of organized crime. Id. The de­
fendants sought disclosure of two government wiretaps in order to support their 
defense of truthfulness or lack of actual malice in writing and printing the article. Id. at 
434. The court denied the defendants' request on the ground that disclosure of wiretap 
evidence pursuant to § 2517(3) must occur "while [the individual is] giving testimony 
under oath or affirmation," and the defendants' request was for non-testimonial disclo­
sure. Id. at 435. 
. 175. County of Oakland, 610 F. Supp. at 370 (citing Dowd, 101 F.R.D. at 435). 
176. 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988). See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3). 
177. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015, 
1020 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). ­
178. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting). Judge Beam wrote for the majority in the panel 
opinion of In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 638­
42 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See supra part 
II.B.1 for a discussion of Judge Beam's majority opinion. 
179. Id. at 1020 (quoting the majority opinion at 1017 (quoting National Broad­
casting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1984»). 
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of statutory construction."180 
In analyzing the issue, Judge Beam looked first to the general 
rules of law dealing with evidentiary exclusions. Judge Beam noted 
the usual axiom that evidence is available unless it is specifically 
protected by a rule of exclusion.181 He criticized the majority opin­
ion for contending that Title III changes this usual axiom to a rule 
that wiretap material is not available for use as evidence unless its 
disclosure and use is specifically authorized by § 2517.182 Judge 
Beam contended that the majority's analysis offends the public pol­
icy of ascertainment of the truth,183 stating that "any construction of 
section 2517(3) and Title III that serves to obscure facts or hinder 
their discovery is contrary to long accepted policy formulations. "184 
Judge Beam also stated that the majority's analysis misreads Title 
III and ignores the more important policy goals underlying the Om­
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968185 of combatting 
organized crime and having access to as much evidence as possible 
to facilitate thiS.l86 
Judge Beam also criticized the majority opinion for ignoring 
the accepted tools for statutory construction ordinarily employed 
by federal courts,187 If a statute is unambiguous, the accepted stat­
utory construction is to look to the plain meaning in order to inter­
pret the statute,188 Judge Beam conceded that the terms of 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 1022. Section 2517(3) contains its own exclusionary rule. It prohibits 
disclosure of electronic surveillance evidence unless there has been compliance with the 
requirements of each section of Title III. See Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court 
and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL­
OGY I, 40 (1983). 
182. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1022 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
183. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,50 (1980) (quoting United 
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2192 (3d ed.») (" 'exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental prin­
ciple that 'the public ... has a right to every man's evidence .... ); United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (limitations on evidence gathering "are in derogation of the 
search for truth"); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) ("normally predom­
inant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth"). 
184. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1021 (Beam, J., dissenting). 

185, Id. at 1022. 

186. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157, 2159. See also Title III - Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil­
lance: Findings, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 211 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 253. 
187. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1021-22 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
188. Id. at 1022. Judge Beam reminded the majority that the cases of the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit require the court to concentrate on language when 
interpreting a statute. For example, Judge Beam noted that in the case of In re Erick­
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§ 2517(3) may be ambiguous, requiring that the plain meaning of 
the statute be ascertained by looking at the specific language of the 
statute as well as the specific language and general design of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act as a whole.189 How­
ever, Judge Beam reasoned that, even if this further analysis was 
conducted, the majority's interpretation of § 2517(3) as precluding 
discovery "stillfails."190 Judge Beam reasoned that the majority's 
interpretation failed because it gave too much weight to Congress' 
concern for privacy. According to Judge Beam, Congress did not 
intend to place the concern for conversational privacy above the 
search for truth, which § 2517 encourages by "permitt[ing] use of 
wiretap evidence through testimqny given under oath in a 'proceed­
ing held under the authority of the United States or of any 
State."'191 
Judge Beam also criticized Judge Heaney's holding that if 
§ 2517(3) allows disclosure of electronic surveillance evidence to 
private civil litigants, it allows disclosure only through open testi­
mony during the private civil litigant's trial and not in any type of 
pretrial proceeding.192 Judge Beam found no support for this hold­
ing in either the language or the legislative history of Title III. Sec­
tion 2515 of Title III refers to evidence received "'in any trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court."'193 In con­
trast, § 2517(3), as amended in 1970, involves much broader lan­
guage.194 Section 2517(3) refers to disclosure "while giving 
testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under 
the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdi­
vision thereof. "195 Judge Beam also reasoned that the Senate Re­
port regarding the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 
which stated that '" [t ]he major purpose of Title III [was] to combat 
organized crime,'" further illustrates that the majority's holding, 
limiting the method of disclosure to private civil litigants to court-
son Partnership·, the Eighth Circuit held that "the language of the statute itself must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive ... [and] when [the court] find[s] the terms of a 
statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete." Id. at 1022 (quoting In re Erickson 
Partnership, 856 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1988)}. 
189. Id.. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 1023 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 2517(3) (1988». 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 1023 n.4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988}) (alteration in original). 
194. Id. 
195. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3} (1988) (emphasis added). See supra note 33 for the text 
of § 2517(3}. 
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room testimonial disclosure, is incorrect.196 
Finally, Judge Beam criticized the majority for interpreting 
§ 2517(3) in a way that effectively restricts the use of wiretap evi­
dence "to only those [civil] actions in which the federal govern­
ment, a state, or a political subdivision of the state is a party."197 He 
stated that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative his­
tory qualifies the type of civil action in which disclosure is author­
ized.198 He reasoned that the words used by Congress in the text of 
§ 2517(3) are in place to assure that all civil RICO actions are in­
cluded, because "[h]ad Congress intended to limit the use' [of testi­
monial disclosure] to a 'trial' or a 'hearing' or a 'proceeding' 
involving only a governmental party, it could have used such limit­
ing words."199 Judge Beam also reasoned that the legislative his­
tory of the statute contains no qualification of the type of civil 
action involved, despite the fact that Congress could easily have 
qualified it.2OO 
In addition to Congress' failure to qualify either the language 
of § 2517(3) or its legislative history, Judge Beam reasoned that the 
majority's holding is erroneous because the Department of Justice 
interpreted § 2517 as permitting disclosure of wiretap tapes to pri­
vate civil litigants, regardless of goveriunental affiliation.201 Judge 
Beam interpreted a'statement by the Department of Justice that it 
had no objection to the release of the Lipton-Webbe tapes to Smith 
as tantamount to giving the government's approva1.202 Judge Beam 
noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that the Jus­
tice Department's interpretation of its own regulations and the stat­
utes it administers must be accepted unless such interpretation is 
196. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1024 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting S. 
REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968, U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2157) (alteration in original). 
197. Specifically, the majority interpreted § 2517 as allowing the disclosure of 
wiretap evidence only in circumstances involving law enforcement. Id. at 1016-17. 
198. Id. at 1024 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. (citing Smith v. Lipton, No. 91-643C(1), slip op. at 8 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 
1991». Judge Beam stated that the Justice Department "[o]bviously ... ha[d] inter­
preted section 2517 and TItle III as permitting disclosure of the Lipton-Webbe tapes to 
private litigants" because the Justice Department had given its approval of the disclo­
sure of the tapes to Smith. Id. 
202. Id. (citing Appellant's Supp. Brief at 4, In re Electronic Evidence (No. 91­
2385». 
398 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:371 
"plainly unreasonable. "203 
III. ANALYSIS 
Section 2517(3) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act should be interpreted by courts to authorize disclo­
sure of communications, intercepted by the government and not 
previously made public, to private civil litigants for use in the pri­
vate civil litigants' actions, either before or during trial. The plain 
language of § 2517(3), as amended in 1970, by providing for disclo­
sure "while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any pro­
ceedingheld under the authority of the United States or of any 
State or political subdivision thereof,"204 supports this position. 
The legislative history of the statute as originally enacted in 1968 
and as amended in 1970 further supports this position, because the 
fight to eliminate organized crime through civil as well as criminal 
means was an important and focused congressional objective.205 Fi­
nally, support for the proposition that § 2517(3), as amended in 
1970, authorizes disclosure of intercepted communications to pri­
vate civil litigants can be found in the broad and generous discovery 
rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.206 
A. Plain Language of Section 2517(3) 
Through Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
Congress amended each title of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 in order to "strengthen and clarify its pro­
visions."207 The language of § 2517(3) as "clarified" is unambigu­
ous and plainly allows the disclosure of previously undisclosed 
electronic surveillance evidence to private civil litigants before and 
during the civil trial, so long as the disclosure occurs while a party 
or nonparty is giving testimony under oath.208 
The Supreme Court has stated that when interpreting a statute, 
courts must focus on plain language, not on legislative history.209 
203. Id. at 1024-25 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984». 
204. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1988). 
205. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157; Pub. L. No. 91·452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073, 1073. 
206. FED. R. CIY. P. 26·37. 
207. H.R REp. No. 1549,. 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007. 
208. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended in 1970. 
209. Burlington N. RR v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (in· 
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For example, the Court has directed lower courts that "[w]hen con­
fronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, 
[courts] ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its 
meaning ... [because] it is not necessary to look beyond the words 
of the statute."210 In such a case, "the language of the statute itself 
'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. "'211 
In interpreting § 2517(3), the Courts of Appeals for both the 
Eighth212 and Second213 Circuits have disregarded the Supreme 
Court's directive and looked not at the language of § 2517(3), but 
to the "legislative struggle leading to its enactment."214 As a result, 
these courts have held that § 2517(3) does not authorize pretrial 
disclosure to private civil litigants. In In re Electronic Evidence, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recited Smith's argument 
that the amended language of § 2517(3) provides for pretrial disclo­
sure of wiretap evidence, but responded with a legislative history 
analysis.215 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Depart­
ment of Justice, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con­
ceded that an argument for disclosure similar to Smith's argument 
in In re Electronic Evidence was plausible if it was based solely on 
the language of § 2517(3) but then dismissed the argument because 
it did not comport with the legislative history of the statute.216 If 
the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Circuits had ex­
vestigating fifteen year old legislative history of statute is "irrelevant"); United States v. 
James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986) (legislative history of statute does not "justif[y] depar­
ture from the plain words of the statute"); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 
(1981) ("when we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is com­
plete"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) 
("the familiar canon of statutory construction that [is] the starting point for interpreting 
a statute is the language of the statute itself'); Tennessee Yalley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 184 n.29 (1978) ("when confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous 
on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning"). 
210. Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184 n.29. 
211. James, 478 U.S. at 606 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 
108). 
212. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(en banc). 
213. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51 (2d 
Cir.1984). 
214. In re Electronic Evidence, 990 F.2d at 1017 (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 53). 
215. Id. The court in In re Electronic Evidence stated that "[w]e simply allow 
Congress's [sic] 'overriding concern for the protection of conversational privacy' ... to 
guide our determination that section 2517 does not authorize disclosure in this case." 
Id. at 1017 n.3 (quoting In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 1992), 
vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc». 
216. NBC, 735 F.2d at 53-54. 
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amined the plain language of the amended § 2517(3)217 more 
closely and compared it with the language of the subsection as orig­
inally enacted,218 they may have held that § 2517(3) does authorize 
pretrial disclosure to private civil litigants. 
The statute as originally enacted provided for disclosure of in­
tercepted electronic communications "while giving testimony under 
oath ... in any criminal proceeding in any court of the United 
States;"219 The 1968 language clearly prohibited disclosure in any 
proceeding conducted pursuant to a civil action. The statute as 
amended in 1970 provides for disclosure "while giving testimony 
under oath ... in any proceeding held under the authority of the 
United States."220 The current language removed the requirement 
of a criminal action. The language also removed the requirement of 
a proceeding held before a court by deleting the phrase "in any 
court" after the word "proceeding." This alteration makes it possi­
ble for such evidence to be disclosed in an out-of-court proceeding, 
such as the taking of a deposition during discovery.221 
Despite this alteration, courts that have decided the issue have 
interpreted "any proceeding" to mean any proceeding that is held 
before a judge, such as a pretrial hearing or a trial itself.222 It is the 
interpretation of the phrase "any proceeding" that will give courts 
the answer to the question of whether section 2517(3) authorizes 
disclosure to private civil RICO litigants in a pretrial, non-court 
proceeding. 
The word "proceeding" is not defined in the earlier sections of 
Title III, as is other language included in § 2517(3), such as "per­
son"223 and "electronic communication."224 Legal dictionaries de­
217. See supra note 33 for the text of § 2517(3) as amended. 
218. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the text of § 2517(3) as origi­
nally enacted. 
219. 18 u.s.c. § 2517(3) (Supp. IV 1969). 
220. § 2517(3) (1988). 
221. FED. R. CIv. P. 27-32 govern the taking and use of depositions generally. 
The taking of a deposition may be considered an out-of-court proceeding because it 
entails the giving of testimony under oath before an authorized officer of the United 
States, the state where the deposition is being taken, or the state where the civil action 
is pending. FED. R. CIv. P. 28(a). 
222. See, e.g., Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir.) (Section 2517(3) 
"relates solely to use in law-enforcement activities and judicial proceedings. "), cert. de­
nied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); United States v. Rosenthal,763 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 
1985) (Section 2517(3) "has determined that ... disclosure in open court is 
appropriate. "). 
223. 18 U.S.c. § 2510(6) (1988). 
224. § 2510(12). 
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fine "proceeding" as "any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or 
inquiry ... in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to 
be given."225 Based on this definition, the discovery methods of 
deposition taking and production of documents in response to a 
subpoena duces tecum226 come within the purview of "any 
proceeding. " 
B. Legislative History of Section 2517(3) 
When statutory language is ambiguous, courts must look to the 
legislative history of the statute to discern its meaning. The Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated that courts "must inter­
pret [a] statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve ... 
and legislative history may play an important part in discerning 
these purposes."227 
The legislative history of § 2517(3) as originally enacted and as 
amended further supports the proposition that the statute autho­
rizes disclosure of previously undisclosed electronic surveillance ev­
idence to private civil litigants before the civil trial begins, 
especially private civil RICO litigants. Courts that have decided 
the issue of whether the section authorizes disclosure to private civil 
litigants have reasoned that, when enacting Title III, Congress' pri­
mary concern was to protect the privacy interests of those persons 
engaged in wire, oral, land electronic communications; therefore, 
Congress could only have intended disclosure of communications 
surveillance evidence to the government in civil actions228 or to pri­
vate litigants and the public at large after the evidence had been 
disclosed publicly in atrial.229 
However, protecting the privacy interests of persons engaged 
in wire, oral, and electronic communications was not Congress' only 
225. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (6th ed. 1990). 
226. A subpoena duces tecum is a subpoena "initiated by a party in litigation, 
compelling production of certain specific documents and other items," to persons not a 
party to the action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990). 
227. Sierra Club v. Qark, 755 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). 
228. See, e.g., In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 
1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep't 
of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1233 
(7th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 69-83, 140-202 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of these cases. 
229. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 1985); 
County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 368-69 (E.D. Mich. 1984), ap­
peal denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. Detroit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 
1985); Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 435 (D.D.C. 1984). See supra notes 84-104 
and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
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concern in enacting Title III. Another "major purpose of TItle III 
[was] to combat organized crime."230 Congress' amendment of TI­
tle III in 1970 illustrates its intention to use § 2517(3) to help eradi­
cate organized crime. Congress amended TItle III within the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. As evidenced by its name, 
the Organized Crime Control Act was enacted to "seek the eradica­
tion of organized crime in the United States."231 In passing legisla­
tion that provided for civil remedies against organized crime, such 
as allowing civil lawsuits for RICO violations, Congress attempted 
to further its stated end. 
Successful civil RICO actions brought by both the government 
and private litigants help to ensure the furtherance of Congress' 
stated objective of eliminating organized crime. Granting civil 
RICO litigants access to as much relevant evidence as possible, as 
early on in the litigation as is practical, helps guarantee the litiga­
tion's success. Therefore, § 2517(3), as enacted and amended, 
should be interpreted by courts as authorizing the disclosure of 
electronic surveillance evidence to private civil RICO litigants 
before the trial as well as during the trial. 
C. Discovery Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Additional support for interpreting § 2517(3) as authorizing 
disclosure of previously undisclosed government-acquired elec­
tronic surveillance material to private civil RICO litigants before 
the civil trial begins can be found in the discovery rules of the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.232 Congress stated that the purpose 
of the discovery rules is to grant civil litigants access to as much 
relevant information as possible.233 This ensures that their claim or 
defense is properly adjudicated. Granting private civil RICO liti­
gants access to electronic surveillance evidence acquired by the 
government corresponds to this purpose. Often, such evidence is 
the only substantial proof that civil RICO claimants have against an 
230. s. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2157. Congress was so concerned with combatting organized crime 
because "[t]hese hard-core groups hard] become more than just loose associations of 
criminals. They hard] developed into corporations of corruption, indeed, quasi-govern­
ments within our society ...." Id. Congress acknowledged that the only effective 
method of discovering the activities of organized crime was to intercept the communica­
tions of organized criminals. Id. at 2159. 
231. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073. 
232. FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37. 
233. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note. 
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alleged RICO offender.234 However, electronic surveillance and 
wiretapping can only be conducted by the government pursuant to 
Title IIJ.235 Therefore, refusing to disclose electronic surveillance 
evidence to the private' civil RICO litigant effectively denies the liti­
gant access to one of the more, if not the most, important pieces of 
evidence of a RICO violation. 
Despite the discovery rules' general language and broad provi­
sions to grant civil litigants access to relevant information,236 the 
courts that have considered § 2517(3) have refused to interpret it as 
authorizing disclosure to private civil litigants during discovery.237 
This is because these courts were primarily concenied with protect­
ing the privacy of persons engaged in wire, oral, or electronic com­
munications. For example, in In re Electronic Evidence, the court 
carefully considered Congress' concern for protecting conversa­
tional privacy when Title III was originally enacted and concluded 
that this concern was not overridden by the language of § 2517(3) 
as amended.238 
However, a civil litigant's access to relevant information pursu­
ant to the discovery rules does not go unchecked. The discovery 
rules contain provisions that address the concerns for the protection 
of privacy that so concerned the In re Electronic Evidence court, 
while meeting the needs of civil litigants to gather all relevant infor­
mation.239 For example, pursuant to Rule 26(b), civil litigants must 
show that they have a substantial need for the materials and infor­
mation they request from an opposing party or third person that 
cannot be met another way.240 In addition, according to Rule 34, 
civil litigants must make a showing of good cause in order for the 
court to compel the person from whom discovery is sought to pro­
234, S, REp, No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2159 ("[I]ntercepting the communications of organized criminals is 
the only effective method of learning about their activities."). 
235. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988). 
236. FED. R. ClY. P. 26(b)(1). 
237. United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1985); National Broad­
casting Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 735 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 610 F. 
Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1984), appeal denied sub nom. Oakland County by Kuhn v. De­
troit, 762 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1985). See supra notes I.C for a discussion of these cases. 
238. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015, 
1018 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See supra part II.C for a discussion of the en banc 
opinion. 
239. FED. R. ClY. P. 26(b)(3) & (c). 
240. FED. R. ClY. P. 26(b)(3). 
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duce documents and tangible objects.241 Though vacated by the en 
banc opinion one year later, the In re Electronic Evidence panel 
opinion's test for disclosing electronic surveillance evidence to pri­
vate civil litigants, as articulated by Judge Beam, provides a model 
that balances the privacy of persons engaged in communications 
with a civil litigant's need for informa~6n.242 'Judge Beam's test re­
quired that a private civil, RIGa litigant articulate a compelling 
need that could not be "accommodated by any other means" before 
the court would order the disclosure of wiretap evidence in the pos­
session of the government.243 The test directed the court deciding 
whether to allow disclosure to "conduc~ an in camera inspection of 
the intercepted communications to evaluate whether a compelling 
need exists."244 
A second provision of the discovery rules that addresses the 
privacy concerns of the In re Electronic Evidence court can be 
found in Rule 2p( c ),245 which authorizes a court to issue a protec­
tive order when necessary to prevent a party or person from whom 
discovery is sought from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
or undue burden or expense."246 In his test, Judge Beam similarly 
provided protection for privacy rights with a discretionary protec­
tive order.247 The final portion of Judge Beam's test directed a dis­
trict court deciding upon disclosure to issue protective orders "as it 
deems appropriate. "248 The protective order allows a court to limit 
discovery requests to specific information or persons or to author­
ize a person from whom discovery is sought to refuse to submit to 
the request.249 
Such limitation on the ability of private civil RICO litigants to 
gain access to electronically recorded conversations and informa­
tion would ensure that civil RICO litigants gain access to no more 
information than is necessary to properly adjudicate their claims, 
241. FED, R. CIY. P. 34. 
242. See supra note 129 and accompanying text for Judge Beam's five-part bal­
ancing test. 
243. In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 642 
(8th Cir. 1992), vacated, 990 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1993) (en bane). 
244. [d. 
245. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(c). 
246. Id. 
247. In re Electronic Evidence, 965 F.2d at 642. See supra note 129 and accompa­
nying text for Judge Beam's five-part balancing test. 
248. Id. 
249. FED. R. CIY. P. 26(e). 
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while persons engaged in wire, oral, or electronic communications 
maintain their privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to privacy is a basic right recognized by the judiciary 
and the legislature as worthy of protection. Individuals who engage 
in confidential communications with others are 'especially afforded 
protection of that right. However, when the communications be­
tween individuals concern illegal activity, such as violations of 
RICO laws, the government has the right to intercept those com­
munications and disclose them at pUblic criminal or civil trials. 
To date, whenever private civil litigants have attempted to gain 
access, during the discovery phase of their litigation, to such com­
munications obtained by the government, courts have refused to 
allow it, citing § 2517(3) of TItle III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as prohibiting such disclosure. These 
courts, however, have erred in their interpretation of § 2517(3). 
Section 2517(3)'s plain language, its legislative history, and the 
much embraced public policy of ascertaining the truth all interact to 
authorize disclosure of intercepted communications to private civil 
RICO litigants either before or during trial. 
Lori K. Odierna 
